{
  "section": "quantum",
  "path": "/quantum",
  "reviewed": "2026-10-29",
  "standing": [
    {
      "title": "No public quantum computer can break today’s public-key encryption.",
      "body": "Designs published since 2025 for breaking RSA-2048 or the elliptic curves behind most signatures need about 1,200 to 1,600 error-corrected qubits. The largest public demonstrations hold dozens. Estimates keep falling: 20 million physical qubits for RSA-2048 in 2019, under one million in 2025.",
      "href": "/quantum/q-day",
      "source": [
        "gidney2019",
        "gidney2025",
        "babbush2026",
        "quantinuum"
      ]
    },
    {
      "title": "The United States set 2030 and 2031 for its most sensitive federal systems.",
      "body": "Executive Order 14412 requires post-quantum key establishment by December 31, 2030 and post-quantum signatures by December 31, 2031 for high value assets and high impact systems. A proposed rule for federal contractors is due by December 19, 2026.",
      "href": "/quantum/deadlines",
      "source": [
        "eo14412"
      ]
    },
    {
      "title": "NIST will retire RSA and elliptic-curve cryptography after 2030.",
      "body": "NIST IR 8547, final on October 27, 2026, deprecates quantum-vulnerable public-key algorithms after 2030 and disallows them under NIST standards after 2035.",
      "href": "/quantum/deadlines",
      "source": [
        "ir8547"
      ]
    },
    {
      "title": "In the Gulf, Saudi Arabia’s central bank set the first dated duties.",
      "body": "SAMA circular 482021280 requires financial institutions to complete procedures for identifying and classifying all cryptographic assets by December 31, 2026 and an enterprise quantum risk assessment by March 31, 2027. Kuwait’s central bank requires a quantum readiness strategy with no date. We found no published post-quantum rule in Qatar, Bahrain or Oman.",
      "href": "/quantum/sama-circular",
      "source": [
        "sama",
        "corf"
      ]
    },
    {
      "title": "Browsers already use post-quantum key exchange. Servers lag.",
      "body": "71% of human HTTPS requests to Cloudflare used post-quantum key exchange in the week to October 28, 2026. About 20% of the origin servers Cloudflare scans support it. Hybrid post-quantum TLS became an IETF standard, RFC 10024, in August 2026.",
      "href": "/quantum/terms#hybrid-key-exchange",
      "source": [
        "radar",
        "rfc10024"
      ]
    },
    {
      "title": "An AI model found the flaw that removed a post-quantum candidate.",
      "body": "On July 29, 2026, the HAWK team withdrew its signature scheme from NIST’s process after Anthropic announced that its AI model had found a mathematical vulnerability in it. The standards already in use, ML-KEM, ML-DSA and SLH-DSA, were not part of that round.",
      "href": "/quantum/terms#quantum-ai",
      "source": [
        "nistRound3"
      ]
    }
  ],
  "changes": [
    {
      "date": "2026-10-27",
      "text": "NIST published IR 8547 in final: quantum-vulnerable public-key algorithms deprecated after 2030 and disallowed after 2035.",
      "source": "ir8547"
    },
    {
      "date": "2026-10-22",
      "text": "US federal civilian agencies’ post-quantum migration plans fell due to OMB, 120 days after M-26-15.",
      "source": "m2615"
    },
    {
      "date": "2026-08-27",
      "text": "SAMA issued circular 482021280 on quantum computing risks, with deadlines of December 31, 2026 and March 31, 2027.",
      "source": "sama"
    },
    {
      "date": "2026-08",
      "text": "The IETF published RFC 10024, hybrid ML-KEM key agreement for TLS 1.3.",
      "source": "rfc10024"
    },
    {
      "date": "2026-07-29",
      "text": "HAWK withdrawn from NIST’s additional signature process after an AI model found a vulnerability.",
      "source": "nistRound3"
    },
    {
      "date": "2026-06-24",
      "text": "OMB issued M-26-15, setting five migration phases from 2026 to 2035.",
      "source": "m2615"
    },
    {
      "date": "2026-06-22",
      "text": "Executive Order 14412 set 2030 and 2031 for federal high value assets and high impact systems.",
      "source": "eo14412"
    },
    {
      "date": "2026-05-15",
      "text": "The IEEE 802.11 Working Group launched P802.11bt to add post-quantum algorithms to Wi-Fi security.",
      "source": "ieee80211bt"
    }
  ],
  "watch": [
    {
      "what": "FAR Council proposed rule requiring federal contractors to meet post-quantum FIPS by 2030",
      "due": "2026-12-19",
      "look": "Federal Register and regulations.gov, FAR cases",
      "source": "eo14412"
    },
    {
      "what": "SAMA deadline for cryptographic asset procedures",
      "due": "2026-12-31",
      "look": "SAMA Rulebook circulars and FAQs",
      "source": "sama"
    },
    {
      "what": "CISA guidance on the minimum elements of a cryptographic bill of materials",
      "due": "2027-03-19",
      "look": "cisa.gov post-quantum resources",
      "source": "eo14412"
    },
    {
      "what": "SAMA deadline for the enterprise quantum risk assessment",
      "due": "2027-03-31",
      "look": "SAMA Rulebook circulars and FAQs",
      "source": "sama"
    },
    {
      "what": "NIST draft standards for HQC and FN-DSA (FIPS 206)",
      "look": "NIST post-quantum publications page",
      "source": "nistPubs"
    },
    {
      "what": "A revision of Saudi Arabia’s National Cryptographic Standards with post-quantum algorithms",
      "look": "nca.gov.sa documents",
      "source": "ncs1"
    },
    {
      "what": "The text and dates of the UAE National Encryption Policy",
      "look": "Cyber Security Council and WAM",
      "source": "uaeNep"
    },
    {
      "what": "Post-quantum rules from the central banks of Qatar, Bahrain, Kuwait and Oman",
      "look": "QCB, CBB Rulebook, CBK and CBO circulars; Oman MTCIT guidelines"
    },
    {
      "what": "IEEE P802.11bt, post-quantum Wi-Fi security",
      "look": "IEEE 802.11 working group pages and liaison letters",
      "source": "ieee80211bt"
    },
    {
      "what": "Post-quantum share of human HTTPS traffic",
      "look": "Cloudflare Radar, first review of each month",
      "source": "radar"
    },
    {
      "what": "New resource estimates for breaking RSA-2048 or 256-bit elliptic curves",
      "look": "arXiv quant-ph and cs.CR, IACR ePrint",
      "source": "gidney2025"
    },
    {
      "what": "Error-corrected quantum hardware milestones",
      "look": "Google Quantum AI, IBM, Quantinuum, IonQ, Microsoft, AWS and DARPA QBI announcements",
      "source": "quantinuum"
    }
  ],
  "deadlines": [
    {
      "group": "United States",
      "date": "2022-05-04",
      "who": "The White House",
      "what": "National Security Memorandum 10 sets the goal of mitigating as much quantum risk as feasible by 2035 and asks for annual cryptographic inventories.",
      "applies": "Federal agencies",
      "force": "Binding",
      "source": "nsm10"
    },
    {
      "group": "United States",
      "date": "2024-08-13",
      "who": "NIST",
      "what": "FIPS 203 (ML-KEM), FIPS 204 (ML-DSA) and FIPS 205 (SLH-DSA) published as final standards.",
      "applies": "Federal systems; used worldwide",
      "force": "Standard",
      "source": "nistPubs"
    },
    {
      "group": "United States",
      "date": "2026-01-23",
      "who": "CISA",
      "what": "Lists product categories with widely available post-quantum support and tells buyers to acquire only PQC-capable products where they exist.",
      "applies": "Federal buyers",
      "force": "Guidance",
      "source": "cisaList"
    },
    {
      "group": "United States",
      "date": "2026-06-22",
      "who": "The White House",
      "what": "Executive Order 14412 signed. It moves the deadline for the most sensitive federal systems from 2035 to 2030 and 2031.",
      "applies": "Federal civilian agencies",
      "force": "Binding",
      "source": "eo14412"
    },
    {
      "group": "United States",
      "date": "2026-06-24",
      "who": "OMB",
      "what": "M-26-15 sets five phases: discovery 2026 to 2027, pilots 2027 to 2028, key establishment 2028 to 2030, signatures 2031, full migration 2035.",
      "applies": "Federal civilian agencies",
      "force": "Binding",
      "source": "m2615"
    },
    {
      "group": "United States",
      "date": "2026-10-22",
      "who": "Federal civilian agencies",
      "what": "Post-quantum migration plans due to OMB and the National Cyber Director.",
      "applies": "Federal civilian agencies",
      "force": "Binding",
      "source": "m2615"
    },
    {
      "group": "United States",
      "date": "2026-10-27",
      "who": "NIST",
      "what": "IR 8547 final. RSA, elliptic-curve and finite-field key exchange and signatures deprecated after 2030 and disallowed after 2035.",
      "applies": "Systems that follow NIST standards",
      "force": "Standard",
      "source": "ir8547"
    },
    {
      "group": "United States",
      "date": "2026-12-19",
      "who": "FAR Council",
      "what": "Proposed rule due requiring covered contractors to comply with NIST’s post-quantum FIPS by December 31, 2030.",
      "applies": "Federal contractors, once adopted",
      "force": "Pending",
      "source": "eo14412"
    },
    {
      "group": "United States",
      "date": "2027-03-19",
      "who": "FAR Council and CISA",
      "what": "Proposed rule due for contractor vulnerability disclosure programs to accept reports of cryptographic weaknesses. CISA guidance due on the minimum elements of a cryptographic bill of materials.",
      "applies": "Federal contractors, once adopted",
      "force": "Pending",
      "source": "eo14412"
    },
    {
      "group": "United States",
      "date": "2030-01-02",
      "who": "Federal agencies",
      "what": "Support TLS 1.3 or a successor.",
      "applies": "Federal agencies",
      "force": "Binding",
      "source": "eo14306"
    },
    {
      "group": "United States",
      "date": "2030-12-31",
      "who": "Federal civilian agencies",
      "what": "High value assets and high impact systems use post-quantum cryptography for key establishment.",
      "applies": "Federal civilian agencies",
      "force": "Binding",
      "source": "eo14412"
    },
    {
      "group": "United States",
      "date": "2030-12-31",
      "who": "Federal contractors",
      "what": "Comply with NIST’s post-quantum FIPS, if the FAR rule is adopted as ordered.",
      "applies": "Covered federal contractors",
      "force": "Pending",
      "source": "eo14412"
    },
    {
      "group": "United States",
      "date": "2031-12-31",
      "who": "Federal civilian agencies",
      "what": "High value assets and high impact systems use post-quantum digital signatures.",
      "applies": "Federal civilian agencies",
      "force": "Binding",
      "source": "eo14412"
    },
    {
      "group": "United States",
      "date": "2035",
      "who": "Federal government and NIST",
      "what": "Full migration, the NSM-10 goal and M-26-15 phase five. NIST disallows quantum-vulnerable public-key algorithms after 2035.",
      "applies": "Federal agencies; systems that follow NIST standards",
      "force": "Binding",
      "source": "ir8547"
    },
    {
      "group": "Gulf states",
      "date": "2025-11",
      "who": "UAE Cyber Security Council",
      "what": "Information Assurance Standard v2.1, control T3.4.4: keep an inventory of systems that use public-key cryptography and test post-quantum standards in a lab before production. No completion date.",
      "applies": "Federal entities and critical information infrastructure",
      "force": "Binding",
      "source": "uaeIas"
    },
    {
      "group": "Gulf states",
      "date": "2025-11-27",
      "who": "UAE",
      "what": "National Encryption Policy and its executive regulation announced. Government entities are to have approved plans for the move to post-quantum cryptography. The text and any dates are not public.",
      "applies": "Government entities",
      "force": "Text not public",
      "source": "uaeNep"
    },
    {
      "group": "Gulf states",
      "date": "2025-12-03",
      "who": "Central Bank of Kuwait",
      "what": "CORF v1.0, controls 7.1.4.1 to 7.1.4.4: adopt quantum-resistant algorithms, assess cryptographic practices periodically, and keep a quantum readiness strategy with timelines and milestones. No completion date.",
      "applies": "CBK-regulated banks and financial institutions",
      "force": "Binding",
      "source": "corf"
    },
    {
      "group": "Gulf states",
      "date": "2026-08-27",
      "who": "SAMA",
      "what": "Circular 482021280 on quantum computing risks issued and in force.",
      "applies": "SAMA-regulated financial institutions",
      "force": "Binding",
      "source": "sama"
    },
    {
      "group": "Gulf states",
      "date": "2026-12-31",
      "who": "SAMA",
      "what": "Procedures for identifying and classifying all cryptographic assets accurate and complete, “by the end of the fourth quarter of 2026”.",
      "applies": "SAMA-regulated financial institutions",
      "force": "Binding",
      "source": "sama"
    },
    {
      "group": "Gulf states",
      "date": "2027-03-31",
      "who": "SAMA",
      "what": "Enterprise-level assessment of quantum computing risks, with action plans, “by the end of the first quarter of 2027”.",
      "applies": "SAMA-regulated financial institutions",
      "force": "Binding",
      "source": "sama"
    },
    {
      "group": "Other governments",
      "date": "2025-03-20",
      "who": "UK NCSC",
      "what": "Discovery and an initial plan by 2028, highest-priority migration by 2031, all systems by 2035.",
      "applies": "UK organizations",
      "force": "Guidance",
      "source": "ncscTimelines"
    },
    {
      "group": "Other governments",
      "date": "2025-06-23",
      "who": "EU NIS Cooperation Group",
      "what": "First steps and national roadmaps by the end of 2026, high-risk use cases by the end of 2030, medium-risk by the end of 2035.",
      "applies": "EU member states",
      "force": "Guidance",
      "source": "euRoadmap"
    },
    {
      "group": "Other governments",
      "date": "2025-10-09",
      "who": "Government of Canada",
      "what": "Departmental plans by April 1, 2026, high-priority systems migrated by the end of 2031, the rest by the end of 2035.",
      "applies": "Federal departments",
      "force": "Binding",
      "source": "canada"
    },
    {
      "group": "Financial sector",
      "date": "2025-03-31",
      "who": "PCI Security Standards Council",
      "what": "PCI DSS 4.0 requirement 12.3.3 takes effect: document the cipher suites and protocols in use and review them at least every 12 months.",
      "applies": "Entities that store, process or transmit card data",
      "force": "Contractual",
      "source": "pci"
    },
    {
      "group": "Financial sector",
      "date": "2026-01-13",
      "who": "G7 Cyber Expert Group",
      "what": "Suggests critical financial systems move in 2030 to 2032 and the sector by about 2035. States that it sets no regulatory expectations.",
      "applies": "G7 financial sectors",
      "force": "Guidance",
      "source": "g7"
    },
    {
      "group": "Standards",
      "date": "2025-03-11",
      "who": "NIST",
      "what": "HQC selected as a backup key-encapsulation algorithm. NIST planned a draft in about a year and a final standard in 2027. No draft had appeared by October 27, 2026.",
      "applies": "Standards process",
      "force": "Standard",
      "source": "hqc"
    },
    {
      "group": "Standards",
      "date": "2026-05-15",
      "who": "IEEE 802.11 Working Group",
      "what": "P802.11bt launched to extend Wi-Fi security to post-quantum algorithms.",
      "applies": "Wi-Fi equipment and networks",
      "force": "Pending",
      "source": "ieee80211bt"
    },
    {
      "group": "Standards",
      "date": "2026-07-29",
      "who": "NIST",
      "what": "HAWK withdrawn from round 3 of the additional signature process after Anthropic announced its AI model had found a mathematical vulnerability.",
      "applies": "Standards process",
      "force": "Standard",
      "source": "nistRound3"
    },
    {
      "group": "Standards",
      "date": "2026-08",
      "who": "IETF",
      "what": "RFC 10024 published as a Proposed Standard: hybrid ML-KEM key agreement for TLS 1.3, including X25519MLKEM768.",
      "applies": "TLS implementations",
      "force": "Standard",
      "source": "rfc10024"
    }
  ],
  "gulf": [
    {
      "state": "Saudi Arabia",
      "status": "SAMA’s circular sets the first dated quantum duties in the Gulf: December 31, 2026 and March 31, 2027. The NCA’s binding National Cryptographic Standards, NCS-1:2020, were written assuming no quantum computers exist and say post-quantum cryptography will come in a later version.",
      "source": [
        "sama",
        "ncs1"
      ]
    },
    {
      "state": "United Arab Emirates",
      "status": "Control T3.4.4 of the national Information Assurance Standard requires a public-key inventory and lab testing of post-quantum standards. The National Encryption Policy announced on November 27, 2025 asks government entities for approved transition plans; its text is not public.",
      "source": [
        "uaeIas",
        "uaeNep"
      ]
    },
    {
      "state": "Kuwait",
      "status": "The central bank’s CORF requires a quantum readiness strategy with timelines and milestones, without a completion date.",
      "source": [
        "corf"
      ]
    },
    {
      "state": "Qatar",
      "status": "We found no published post-quantum rule. The NCSA’s September 2026 licensing form lists post-quantum cryptography assessment and quantum key distribution implementation as cybersecurity services a firm can add to its license. Ooredoo, HBKU and the Ministry of Defense run a quantum key distribution testbed on Ooredoo’s network.",
      "source": [
        "qatarForm",
        "ooredoo"
      ]
    },
    {
      "state": "Bahrain",
      "status": "We found no published post-quantum rule from the CBB or the NCSC. The NCSC announced on December 23, 2025 that it is deploying cryptographic discovery software across more than 60 ministry environments.",
      "source": [
        "bahrain"
      ]
    },
    {
      "state": "Oman",
      "status": "We found no published post-quantum rule. The Ministry of Transport, Communications and Information Technology lists a guideline titled “Quantum Computing”, dated June 1, 2026, which we could not open.",
      "source": []
    }
  ],
  "estimates": [
    {
      "year": "2019",
      "authors": "Gidney and Ekerå",
      "target": "RSA-2048",
      "physical": "About 20 million",
      "time": "About 8 hours",
      "assumptions": "Superconducting surface code; 0.1% gate error; 1 µs cycle",
      "review": "Peer reviewed",
      "source": "gidney2019"
    },
    {
      "year": "2025",
      "authors": "Gidney",
      "target": "RSA-2048",
      "physical": "Under 1 million",
      "time": "Under a week",
      "assumptions": "Same error rate and cycle time as 2019; about 1,400 logical qubits",
      "review": "Preprint",
      "source": "gidney2025"
    },
    {
      "year": "2026",
      "authors": "Webster and others",
      "target": "RSA-2048",
      "physical": "Under 100,000",
      "time": "About a month",
      "assumptions": "Quantum LDPC codes with long-range connectivity not yet built at scale",
      "review": "Preprint",
      "source": "webster2026"
    },
    {
      "year": "2026",
      "authors": "Babbush, Gidney and others (Google)",
      "target": "secp256k1, the curve behind Bitcoin",
      "physical": "Under 500,000",
      "time": "18 to 23 minutes",
      "assumptions": "Superconducting; at most about 1,450 logical qubits; circuits withheld, counts backed by a zero-knowledge proof",
      "review": "Peer reviewed",
      "source": "babbush2026"
    },
    {
      "year": "2026",
      "authors": "Cain and others",
      "target": "P-256",
      "physical": "About 26,000 atoms",
      "time": "A few days",
      "assumptions": "Neutral atoms with high-rate codes; RSA-2048 10 to 100 times longer",
      "review": "Preprint",
      "source": "cain2026"
    },
    {
      "year": "2026",
      "authors": "Häner and others",
      "target": "secp256k1",
      "physical": "19,397 ions",
      "time": "About 26 days",
      "assumptions": "Trapped ions; about 1,450 logical qubits; 63% success per run",
      "review": "Preprint",
      "source": "haner2026"
    }
  ],
  "claims": [
    {
      "claim": "Chinese researchers broke RSA with a D-Wave quantum annealer.",
      "finding": "The work factored a 22-bit number. RSA keys in use are 2,048 bits or more.",
      "source": "dwave"
    },
    {
      "claim": "Google’s Willow chip broke, or nearly broke, encryption.",
      "finding": "The December 2024 announcement claimed error correction below threshold and a sampling benchmark. It made no cryptographic claim.",
      "source": "willowPost"
    },
    {
      "claim": "Quantum Echoes means encryption is next.",
      "finding": "The October 2025 speedup was for a physics simulation task on 103 qubits, unrelated to code-breaking.",
      "source": "echoes"
    },
    {
      "claim": "Quantum computers have started breaking Bitcoin keys.",
      "finding": "The largest public attack, which won a 1 bitcoin prize in April 2026, recovered a 15-bit key. Bitcoin keys are 256 bits.",
      "source": "ecc15"
    },
    {
      "claim": "Bitcoin can be broken in nine minutes.",
      "finding": "An estimate for a machine of under 500,000 qubits that does not exist, starting from a precomputed state.",
      "source": "babbush2026"
    },
    {
      "claim": "Quantum factoring records show steady progress toward breaking RSA.",
      "finding": "Two researchers reproduced the published records with an 8-bit home computer from 1981, an abacus and a dog. The records use small, specially chosen numbers.",
      "source": "gutmann"
    }
  ],
  "terms": [
    {
      "slug": "quantum-computer",
      "term": "Quantum computer",
      "aka": [
        "Quantum computing"
      ],
      "ar": "الحوسبة الكمية",
      "status": "Research",
      "definition": "A computer that uses qubits, which can hold superpositions of 0 and 1 and become entangled. For a few problems, including factoring and discrete logarithms, a large one would be far faster than any known method on ordinary computers.",
      "security": "Today’s machines are too small and too error-prone to threaten encryption. In the Gulf, Aramco and Pasqal inaugurated a neutral-atom system that “can control 200 qubits” in Dhahran in May 2026, for industrial research.",
      "sources": [
        "willow",
        "aramco"
      ]
    },
    {
      "slug": "logical-qubit",
      "term": "Logical qubit",
      "aka": [
        "Physical qubit",
        "Error-corrected qubit",
        "Fault-tolerant quantum computing"
      ],
      "status": "Research",
      "definition": "A qubit built from many physical qubits with error correction, so that it holds its state far longer than any single physical qubit. Code-breaking estimates are counted in logical qubits; headlines usually quote physical ones.",
      "security": "The number to watch. Published attacks on RSA-2048 and elliptic curves need about 1,200 to 1,600 logical qubits. Quantinuum reported 48 logical qubits from 98 physical in 2025.",
      "sources": [
        "gidney2025",
        "babbush2026",
        "quantinuum"
      ]
    },
    {
      "slug": "crqc",
      "term": "Cryptographically relevant quantum computer",
      "aka": [
        "CRQC",
        "Q-Day",
        "Y2Q"
      ],
      "status": "Does not exist yet",
      "definition": "A quantum computer large and reliable enough to break the public-key cryptography in use today. Q-Day is the informal name for the day one exists.",
      "security": "None exists in public view, and no government document we read names a year. OMB’s M-26-15 says steady advances “may yield a CRQC in the coming decade”. The US set its 2030 and 2031 deadlines on that basis.",
      "sources": [
        "m2615",
        "eo14412"
      ]
    },
    {
      "slug": "shors-algorithm",
      "term": "Shor’s algorithm",
      "status": "Research",
      "definition": "The quantum algorithm, published in 1994, that factors large numbers and computes discrete logarithms efficiently on a large enough quantum computer.",
      "security": "It is why RSA, Diffie-Hellman and elliptic-curve cryptography, including ECDSA signatures and Bitcoin keys, must be replaced. NIST deprecates them after 2030.",
      "sources": [
        "ir8547"
      ]
    },
    {
      "slug": "grovers-algorithm",
      "term": "Grover’s algorithm",
      "aka": [
        "Is AES-256 quantum safe?"
      ],
      "status": "Research",
      "definition": "A quantum search algorithm that cuts a brute-force key search to roughly the square root of the usual number of tries.",
      "security": "Symmetric encryption survives with adequate key sizes. NIST IR 8547 keeps AES-128, AES-192 and AES-256 in its approved tables and uses them as the yardsticks for post-quantum security categories.",
      "sources": [
        "ir8547"
      ]
    },
    {
      "slug": "harvest-now-decrypt-later",
      "term": "Harvest now, decrypt later",
      "aka": [
        "HNDL",
        "Store now, decrypt later",
        "Catch now, break later"
      ],
      "ar": "اجمع الآن وفك التشفير لاحقًا",
      "status": "Research",
      "definition": "Recording encrypted traffic or copying encrypted data today, to decrypt it once a quantum computer can recover the keys.",
      "security": "NIST calls it “one of the main reasons” the migration is urgent, and Executive Order 14412 names it as a risk. We found no public advisory or incident report that documents a specific case. It threatens confidentiality only; signatures cannot be forged retroactively.",
      "sources": [
        "ir8547",
        "eo14412"
      ]
    },
    {
      "slug": "post-quantum-cryptography",
      "term": "Post-quantum cryptography",
      "aka": [
        "PQC",
        "Quantum-safe cryptography",
        "Quantum-resistant cryptography",
        "Quantum-proof encryption"
      ],
      "ar": "التشفير ما بعد الكم",
      "status": "Standard",
      "definition": "Ordinary software algorithms built on math problems that quantum computers are not known to solve efficiently. They run on today’s computers and networks.",
      "security": "The fix the security agencies we read recommend first. NIST published the first three standards on August 13, 2024. “Quantum-proof” is a marketing word: the standards rest on problems with no known efficient quantum attack, which is not a proof.",
      "sources": [
        "nistPubs",
        "ncscQkd",
        "qkdPosition"
      ]
    },
    {
      "slug": "ml-kem",
      "term": "ML-KEM",
      "aka": [
        "Kyber",
        "CRYSTALS-Kyber",
        "FIPS 203"
      ],
      "status": "Deployed",
      "definition": "Module-Lattice-Based Key-Encapsulation Mechanism, the NIST standard for agreeing a shared key. FIPS 203, final on August 13, 2024.",
      "security": "NIST recommends ML-KEM-768 as the default. Through hybrid key exchange it already protects most of the human web traffic Cloudflare sees.",
      "sources": [
        "nistPubs",
        "ir8547",
        "radar"
      ]
    },
    {
      "slug": "ml-dsa",
      "term": "ML-DSA",
      "aka": [
        "Dilithium",
        "CRYSTALS-Dilithium",
        "FIPS 204"
      ],
      "status": "Standard",
      "definition": "Module-Lattice-Based Digital Signature Algorithm, the NIST standard for general-purpose signatures. FIPS 204, final on August 13, 2024.",
      "security": "Signatures move later than key exchange because certificates and roots of trust must change across whole ecosystems. US federal systems must sign with post-quantum algorithms by December 31, 2031.",
      "sources": [
        "nistPubs",
        "eo14412"
      ]
    },
    {
      "slug": "slh-dsa",
      "term": "SLH-DSA",
      "aka": [
        "SPHINCS+",
        "FIPS 205"
      ],
      "status": "Standard",
      "definition": "Stateless Hash-Based Digital Signature Algorithm. FIPS 205, final on August 13, 2024. Its security rests only on hash functions.",
      "security": "Larger and slower than ML-DSA, kept as a conservative alternative that does not depend on lattices.",
      "sources": [
        "nistPubs"
      ]
    },
    {
      "slug": "fn-dsa-and-hqc",
      "term": "FN-DSA and HQC",
      "aka": [
        "Falcon",
        "FIPS 206",
        "Hamming Quasi-Cyclic"
      ],
      "status": "In development",
      "definition": "FN-DSA, derived from Falcon, is a compact lattice signature planned as FIPS 206. HQC, selected on March 11, 2025, is a backup key-encapsulation method built on different math from ML-KEM.",
      "security": "Neither had a draft standard published as of October 27, 2026. NIST said in March 2025 that it expected a final HQC standard in 2027.",
      "sources": [
        "hqc",
        "ir8547"
      ]
    },
    {
      "slug": "hybrid-key-exchange",
      "term": "Hybrid key exchange",
      "aka": [
        "X25519MLKEM768",
        "PQ/T hybrid",
        "Post-quantum TLS"
      ],
      "status": "Deployed",
      "definition": "Combining a classical key exchange such as X25519 with ML-KEM, so a connection stays secure if either one holds.",
      "security": "Standardized for TLS 1.3 in RFC 10024 (August 2026) and on by default in current Chrome, Edge, Firefox and Safari, OpenSSL 3.5 and later, and OpenSSH 10. 71% of human HTTPS requests to Cloudflare used it in the week to October 28, 2026; about 20% of origin servers Cloudflare scans support it.",
      "sources": [
        "rfc10024",
        "radar",
        "openssh"
      ]
    },
    {
      "slug": "cryptographic-inventory",
      "term": "Cryptographic inventory",
      "aka": [
        "CBOM",
        "Cryptographic bill of materials",
        "Crypto discovery"
      ],
      "ar": "الأصول التشفيرية",
      "status": "Standard",
      "definition": "A record of where an organization uses cryptography: which systems, data, keys, certificates, protocols and suppliers, and which algorithms each depends on. A cryptographic bill of materials lists the same for one product.",
      "security": "The first duty in nearly every rule. SAMA requires inventory procedures by December 31, 2026; the UAE standard and OMB require inventories; Executive Order 14412 orders CISA guidance on the minimum elements of a cryptographic bill of materials by March 19, 2027.",
      "sources": [
        "sama",
        "uaeIas",
        "eo14412"
      ]
    },
    {
      "slug": "crypto-agility",
      "term": "Crypto-agility",
      "aka": [
        "Cryptographic agility",
        "Cryptographic resilience"
      ],
      "ar": "المرونة التشفيرية",
      "status": "Standard",
      "definition": "The ability to change algorithms, keys and certificates without rebuilding the systems that use them.",
      "security": "SAMA’s circular asks institutions to assess the المرونة التشفيرية of priority assets. Its official English translation says “cryptographic resilience”; the Arabic reads closer to agility.",
      "sources": [
        "samaAr",
        "sama"
      ]
    },
    {
      "slug": "cnsa-2",
      "term": "CNSA 2.0",
      "aka": [
        "Commercial National Security Algorithm Suite 2.0"
      ],
      "status": "Standard",
      "definition": "The NSA’s algorithm suite for US national security systems, announced in September 2022. It names ML-KEM-1024, ML-DSA-87, the hash-based LMS and XMSS for firmware signing, AES-256 and SHA-384 or SHA-512.",
      "security": "It governs national security systems, which Executive Order 14412 and M-26-15 exclude from their own deadlines. Contractors that build for those systems answer to it.",
      "sources": [
        "cnsa",
        "eo14412"
      ]
    },
    {
      "slug": "quantum-key-distribution",
      "term": "Quantum key distribution",
      "aka": [
        "QKD",
        "Quantum cryptography",
        "Quantum encryption"
      ],
      "ar": "توزيع المفاتيح الكمية",
      "status": "Deployed",
      "definition": "Sharing a secret key by sending single photons over fiber or free space, so that eavesdropping disturbs them. It needs special hardware and does not authenticate the other end by itself.",
      "security": "The UK NCSC “will not support the use of QKD for government or military applications” and recommends post-quantum cryptography as the primary fix. Four European agencies say claims of unconditional security “can never apply to actual implementations”. In Qatar, Ooredoo, HBKU and the Ministry of Defense run a QKD testbed.",
      "sources": [
        "ncscQkd",
        "qkdPosition",
        "ooredoo"
      ]
    },
    {
      "slug": "trusted-node",
      "term": "Trusted node",
      "aka": [
        "Trusted relay"
      ],
      "status": "Deployed",
      "definition": "A relay site in a long-distance QKD network where the key is decrypted and re-sent. Fiber QKD reaches about one hundred kilometres before it needs one.",
      "security": "Keys sit in the clear at each node, so every node is a physical and insider target. The European agencies conclude that end-to-end security “cannot be achieved over long distances using fibre-based QKD.”",
      "sources": [
        "qkdPosition"
      ]
    },
    {
      "slug": "quantum-network",
      "term": "Quantum network",
      "aka": [
        "Quantum internet",
        "Entanglement distribution",
        "Quantum repeater"
      ],
      "status": "Research",
      "definition": "A network that carries quantum states between devices. The UK NCSC separates three kinds: quantum replacements for classical security functions such as QKD, functions only quantum parts can provide, and networks that distribute entanglement between quantum computers.",
      "security": "Today’s deployments are QKD links and testbeds. A network that links quantum computers is still research. Whatever the label, the parts a tester can examine are the classical ones around it: key delivery interfaces, fallback paths, management systems and the buildings that house the nodes.",
      "sources": [
        "ncscQkd"
      ]
    },
    {
      "slug": "quantum-wi-fi",
      "term": "Quantum Wi-Fi",
      "aka": [
        "Post-quantum Wi-Fi",
        "Quantum-safe Wi-Fi",
        "WPA3 quantum",
        "802.11bt"
      ],
      "status": "In development",
      "definition": "There is no quantum Wi-Fi product category. The real work is P802.11bt, an IEEE project launched in May 2026 to add post-quantum algorithms to Wi-Fi security.",
      "security": "The IEEE 802.11 Working Group says quantum computing is expected to weaken the public-key cryptography behind today’s Wi-Fi authentication and key establishment. Until 802.11bt is finished and certified, Wi-Fi’s handshakes stay quantum-vulnerable.",
      "sources": [
        "ieee80211bt"
      ]
    },
    {
      "slug": "quantum-safe-vpn",
      "term": "Quantum-safe VPN and SSH",
      "aka": [
        "Post-quantum VPN",
        "PQC IPsec",
        "Post-quantum SSH"
      ],
      "status": "Deployed",
      "definition": "Remote access and site links whose key exchange uses ML-KEM, usually as a hybrid with a classical method.",
      "security": "OpenSSH has used a hybrid ML-KEM key exchange by default since version 10.0 (April 2025). VPN support varies by vendor and configuration, so it has to be checked device by device.",
      "sources": [
        "openssh"
      ]
    },
    {
      "slug": "quantum-random-number-generator",
      "term": "Quantum random number generator",
      "aka": [
        "QRNG"
      ],
      "status": "Deployed",
      "definition": "Hardware that draws random numbers from a quantum process such as photon detection.",
      "security": "No standard we read requires one. NIST’s entropy-source standard covers physical noise sources of any kind, and the UK NCSC says classical generators “have met these needs for many years, and continue to do so”. A QRNG does not make RSA or elliptic curves safe.",
      "sources": [
        "sp80090b",
        "ncscQkd"
      ]
    },
    {
      "slug": "quantum-ai",
      "term": "Quantum AI",
      "aka": [
        "Quantum artificial intelligence",
        "Quantum machine learning",
        "Is Quantum AI legit?"
      ],
      "status": "Fraud warning",
      "definition": "Three different things share the name: Google’s quantum computing lab, Google Quantum AI; research on machine learning with quantum computers; and a family of fake trading platforms.",
      "security": "The trading platforms use deepfake celebrity videos and fake news pages to take deposits. The UK FCA, Germany’s BaFin, the Central Bank of Ireland and Australia’s National Anti-Scam Centre have warned against them. Separately, AI is already changing cryptography: in July 2026 an AI model found the flaw that removed HAWK from NIST’s signature process.",
      "sources": [
        "fcaQai",
        "bafinQai",
        "cbiQai",
        "asicQai",
        "nistRound3"
      ]
    }
  ],
  "sources": {
    "nsm10": {
      "title": "National Security Memorandum 10, The White House, May 4, 2022",
      "url": "https://bidenwhitehouse.archives.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2022/05/04/national-security-memorandum-on-promoting-united-states-leadership-in-quantum-computing-while-mitigating-risks-to-vulnerable-cryptographic-systems/",
      "checked": "2026-10-28"
    },
    "nistPubs": {
      "title": "Post-quantum cryptography publications, NIST",
      "url": "https://csrc.nist.gov/Projects/post-quantum-cryptography/publications",
      "checked": "2026-10-28"
    },
    "cisaList": {
      "title": "Product categories for technologies that use post-quantum cryptography standards, CISA, January 23, 2026",
      "url": "https://www.cisa.gov/resources-tools/resources/product-categories-technologies-use-post-quantum-cryptography-standards",
      "checked": "2026-10-28"
    },
    "eo14306": {
      "title": "Executive Order 14306, June 6, 2025",
      "url": "https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/DCPD-202500669/html/DCPD-202500669.htm",
      "checked": "2026-10-28"
    },
    "eo14412": {
      "title": "Executive Order 14412, Securing the Nation Against Advanced Cryptographic Attacks, June 22, 2026",
      "url": "https://www.whitehouse.gov/presidential-actions/2026/06/securing-the-nation-against-advanced-cryptographic-attacks/",
      "checked": "2026-10-29"
    },
    "m2615": {
      "title": "OMB Memorandum M-26-15, Execution of the Migration to Post-Quantum Cryptography, June 24, 2026",
      "url": "https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2026/06/M-26-15-Execution-of-the-Migration-to-Post-Quantum-Cryptography.pdf",
      "checked": "2026-10-28"
    },
    "ir8547": {
      "title": "NIST IR 8547, Transition to Post-Quantum Cryptography Standards, final, October 27, 2026",
      "url": "https://csrc.nist.gov/pubs/ir/8547/final",
      "checked": "2026-10-29"
    },
    "hqc": {
      "title": "NIST selects HQC as fifth algorithm for post-quantum encryption, NIST, March 11, 2025",
      "url": "https://www.nist.gov/news-events/news/2025/03/nist-selects-hqc-fifth-algorithm-post-quantum-encryption",
      "checked": "2026-10-28"
    },
    "nistRound3": {
      "title": "Nine candidates advance to third round of additional digital signatures for PQC, NIST, May 14, 2026, updated July 29, 2026",
      "url": "https://www.nist.gov/news-events/news/2026/05/nine-candidates-advance-third-round-additional-digital-signatures-pqc",
      "checked": "2026-10-29"
    },
    "rfc10024": {
      "title": "RFC 10024, Post-Quantum Traditional (PQ/T) Hybrid Key Agreement Mechanisms for TLS 1.3, IETF, August 2026",
      "url": "https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc10024.html",
      "checked": "2026-10-29"
    },
    "ieee80211bt": {
      "title": "Liaison communication to the Wi-Fi Alliance regarding the PQC project, IEEE 802.11 Working Group, approved May 15, 2026",
      "url": "https://www.ieee802.org/11/Liaisons/2026-05-18%20Liaison%20communication%20to%20WFA%20regarding%20PQC.pdf",
      "checked": "2026-10-29"
    },
    "ncscTimelines": {
      "title": "Timelines for migration to post-quantum cryptography, UK NCSC, March 20, 2025",
      "url": "https://www.ncsc.gov.uk/guidance/pqc-migration-timelines",
      "checked": "2026-10-28"
    },
    "euRoadmap": {
      "title": "A coordinated implementation roadmap for the transition to post-quantum cryptography, NIS Cooperation Group, June 23, 2025",
      "url": "https://digital-strategy.ec.europa.eu/en/library/coordinated-implementation-roadmap-transition-post-quantum-cryptography",
      "checked": "2026-10-28"
    },
    "canada": {
      "title": "Migrating the Government of Canada to post-quantum cryptography, Government of Canada",
      "url": "https://www.canada.ca/en/government/system/digital-government/policies-standards/spin/migrating-government-canada-post-quantum-cryptography.html",
      "checked": "2026-10-28"
    },
    "g7": {
      "title": "G7 Cyber Expert Group statement on a coordinated roadmap for the transition to post-quantum cryptography, January 13, 2026",
      "url": "https://home.treasury.gov/system/files/136/G7-CEG-Quantum-Roadmap.pdf",
      "checked": "2026-10-28"
    },
    "pci": {
      "title": "Summary of changes from PCI DSS version 3.2.1 to 4.0, PCI Security Standards Council",
      "url": "https://listings.pcisecuritystandards.org/documents/PCI-DSS-v3-2-1-to-v4-0-Summary-of-Changes-r1.pdf",
      "checked": "2026-10-28"
    },
    "sama": {
      "title": "Enhancement of Operational Resilience to Address Quantum Computing Risks, circular 482021280, SAMA, August 27, 2026 (English translation)",
      "url": "https://rulebook.sama.gov.sa/en/enhancement-operational-resilience-address-quantum-computing-risks",
      "checked": "2026-10-29"
    },
    "samaAr": {
      "title": "رفع مستوى المتانة التشغيلية لمواجهة مخاطر الحوسبة الكمية, SAMA, August 27, 2026 (Arabic original)",
      "url": "https://rulebook.sama.gov.sa/ar/%D8%B1%D9%81%D8%B9-%D9%85%D8%B3%D8%AA%D9%88%D9%89-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%85%D8%AA%D8%A7%D9%86%D8%A9-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AA%D8%B4%D8%BA%D9%8A%D9%84%D9%8A%D8%A9-%D9%84%D9%85%D9%88%D8%A7%D8%AC%D9%87%D8%A9-%D9%85%D8%AE%D8%A7%D8%B7%D8%B1-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AD%D9%88%D8%B3%D8%A8%D8%A9-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%83%D9%85%D9%8A%D8%A9",
      "checked": "2026-10-28"
    },
    "ncs1": {
      "title": "National Cryptographic Standards NCS-1:2020, National Cybersecurity Authority, Saudi Arabia",
      "url": "https://nca.gov.sa/ncs_en.pdf",
      "checked": "2026-10-28"
    },
    "corf": {
      "title": "Cyber and Operational Resilience Framework (CORF) v1.0, Central Bank of Kuwait, December 3, 2025",
      "url": "https://www.cbk.gov.kw/en/images/corf-170113_v10_tcm10-170113.pdf",
      "checked": "2026-10-29"
    },
    "uaeIas": {
      "title": "UAE Information Assurance Standard v2.1, UAE Cyber Security Council, November 2025",
      "url": "https://csc.gov.ae/documents/38662/0/UAE+INFORMATION+ASSURANCE+STANDARD.pdf/abe25941-cdcf-2e44-9fd9-bf6bc8095f2a",
      "checked": "2026-10-28"
    },
    "uaeNep": {
      "title": "UAE announces approval of National Encryption Policy, WAM report as carried by Tribune India, November 27, 2025",
      "url": "https://www.tribuneindia.com/news/world/uae-announces-approval-of-national-encryption-policy-issuance-of-executive-regulation",
      "checked": "2026-10-28",
      "secondary": true
    },
    "qatarForm": {
      "title": "Cybersecurity Services Activity Addition Request Form v1.0, National Cyber Security Agency, Qatar, September 2026",
      "url": "https://ncsa.gov.qa/shared/document_library/94787172324409/33000/11059/1.0~fafd6f87-f313-4682-b386-2717935fa9b9?mimetype=application%2Fpdf&filename=NCSA-CAD-CSBAA-CSRF%20%28CS%20Business%20Activity%20Addition%20Request%20Form%29%20Sep%20V1.pdf",
      "checked": "2026-10-28"
    },
    "ooredoo": {
      "title": "Ooredoo, Hamad Bin Khalifa University and Ministry of Defense establish Qatar’s first quantum-safe communications link, May 31, 2026",
      "url": "https://www.ooredoo.qa/web/en/press-release/ooredoo-hamad-bin-khalifa-university-and-ministry-of-defense-establish-qatars-first-quantum-safe-communications-link/",
      "checked": "2026-10-28"
    },
    "bahrain": {
      "title": "Bahrain government partnership with SandboxAQ, SandboxAQ, December 23, 2025",
      "url": "https://www.sandboxaq.com/press/bahrain-government-takes-definitive-step-toward-building-a-quantum-safe-economy-through-strategic-partnership-with-sandboxaq",
      "checked": "2026-10-28"
    },
    "aramco": {
      "title": "Aramco and Pasqal launch Saudi Arabia’s first quantum computer, joint release, May 2026",
      "url": "https://www.aap.com.au/aapreleases/cision20260518ae61980/",
      "checked": "2026-10-28"
    },
    "ncscQkd": {
      "title": "Quantum networking technologies, UK NCSC, August 5, 2025",
      "url": "https://www.ncsc.gov.uk/whitepaper/quantum-networking-technologies",
      "checked": "2026-10-29"
    },
    "sp80090b": {
      "title": "NIST SP 800-90B, Recommendation for the Entropy Sources Used for Random Bit Generation",
      "url": "https://csrc.nist.gov/pubs/sp/800/90/b/final",
      "checked": "2026-10-28"
    },
    "cnsa": {
      "title": "Announcing the Commercial National Security Algorithm Suite 2.0, NSA",
      "url": "https://media.defense.gov/2025/May/30/2003728741/-1/-1/0/CSA_CNSA_2.0_ALGORITHMS.PDF",
      "checked": "2026-10-28"
    },
    "qkdPosition": {
      "title": "Position paper on quantum key distribution, ANSSI, BSI, NLNCSA and the Swedish National Communications Security Authority, January 2024",
      "url": "https://www.bsi.bund.de/SharedDocs/Downloads/EN/BSI/Crypto/Quantum_Positionspapier.pdf?__blob=publicationFile&v=4",
      "checked": "2026-10-28"
    },
    "radar": {
      "title": "Post-quantum encryption adoption, Cloudflare Radar",
      "url": "https://radar.cloudflare.com/adoption-and-usage",
      "checked": "2026-10-28"
    },
    "openssh": {
      "title": "OpenSSH release notes",
      "url": "https://www.openssh.org/releasenotes.html",
      "checked": "2026-10-28"
    },
    "willow": {
      "title": "Quantum error correction below the surface code threshold, Google Quantum AI and collaborators, Nature, 2025",
      "url": "https://arxiv.org/abs/2408.13687",
      "checked": "2026-10-28"
    },
    "willowPost": {
      "title": "Meet Willow, our state-of-the-art quantum chip, Google, December 9, 2024",
      "url": "https://blog.google/technology/research/google-willow-quantum-chip/",
      "checked": "2026-10-28"
    },
    "echoes": {
      "title": "A verifiable quantum advantage, Google Research, October 22, 2025",
      "url": "https://research.google/blog/a-verifiable-quantum-advantage/",
      "checked": "2026-10-28"
    },
    "quantinuum": {
      "title": "Quantinuum Inc. prospectus, Form 424B4, SEC EDGAR, June 3, 2026",
      "url": "https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/0002110105/000162828026041003/quantinuum-424b4.htm",
      "checked": "2026-10-28"
    },
    "gidney2019": {
      "title": "How to factor 2048 bit RSA integers in 8 hours using 20 million noisy qubits, Gidney and Ekerå, Quantum, 2021",
      "url": "https://arxiv.org/abs/1905.09749",
      "checked": "2026-10-28"
    },
    "gidney2025": {
      "title": "How to factor 2048 bit RSA integers with less than a million noisy qubits, Gidney, preprint, May 2025",
      "url": "https://arxiv.org/abs/2505.15917",
      "checked": "2026-10-28"
    },
    "webster2026": {
      "title": "The Pinnacle architecture, Webster and others, preprint, February 2026",
      "url": "https://arxiv.org/abs/2602.11457",
      "checked": "2026-10-28"
    },
    "babbush2026": {
      "title": "Elliptic-curve resource estimate for secp256k1, Babbush, Zalcman, Gidney and others, PRX Quantum, August 21, 2026",
      "url": "https://arxiv.org/abs/2603.28846",
      "checked": "2026-10-28"
    },
    "cain2026": {
      "title": "Shor’s algorithm on neutral atoms, Cain, Xu, King and others, preprint, March 2026",
      "url": "https://arxiv.org/abs/2603.28627",
      "checked": "2026-10-28"
    },
    "haner2026": {
      "title": "Computing 256-bit elliptic-curve logarithms on trapped ions, Häner and others, preprint, September 2026",
      "url": "https://arxiv.org/abs/2609.05625",
      "checked": "2026-10-28"
    },
    "gri2025": {
      "title": "Quantum Threat Timeline Report 2025, Global Risk Institute and evolutionQ, March 2026",
      "url": "https://globalriskinstitute.org/publication/quantum-threat-timeline-report-2025b/",
      "checked": "2026-10-28"
    },
    "google2029": {
      "title": "Quantum frontiers may be closer than they appear, Google, March 2026",
      "url": "https://blog.google/innovation-and-ai/technology/safety-security/cryptography-migration-timeline/",
      "checked": "2026-10-28"
    },
    "usc1813": {
      "title": "50 U.S.C. § 1813, retention of incidentally acquired communications",
      "url": "https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/50/1813",
      "checked": "2026-10-29"
    },
    "gutmann": {
      "title": "Replication of quantum factorisation records with an 8-bit home computer, an abacus, and a dog, Gutmann and Neuhaus, 2025",
      "url": "https://eprint.iacr.org/2025/1237",
      "checked": "2026-10-28"
    },
    "dwave": {
      "title": "Experts slam Chinese research on quantum encryption attack, TechTarget",
      "url": "https://www.techtarget.com/cybersecurity/news/366613737/Experts-slam-Chinese-research-on-quantum-encryption-attack",
      "checked": "2026-10-28",
      "secondary": true
    },
    "ecc15": {
      "title": "Researcher wins 1 bitcoin bounty for largest quantum attack on underlying tech, CoinDesk, April 24, 2026",
      "url": "https://www.coindesk.com/tech/2026/04/24/researcher-wins-1-bitcoin-bounty-for-largest-quantum-attack-on-underlying-tech",
      "checked": "2026-10-28",
      "secondary": true
    },
    "fcaQai": {
      "title": "Quantum AI, warning, Financial Conduct Authority, May 14, 2025, updated March 3, 2026",
      "url": "https://www.fca.org.uk/news/warnings/quantum-ai",
      "checked": "2026-10-28"
    },
    "bafinQai": {
      "title": "Quantum AI: BaFin warns consumers about further websites, BaFin, March 2025",
      "url": "https://www.bafin.de/SharedDocs/Veroeffentlichungen/EN/Verbrauchermitteilung/unerlaubte/2025/meldung_2025_03_24_Quantum_AI_en.html",
      "checked": "2026-10-28"
    },
    "cbiQai": {
      "title": "Quantum AI: Central Bank of Ireland issues warning on unregistered firm, December 2, 2024",
      "url": "https://centralbank.ie/news/article/warning-notice-quantum-ai-central-bank-of-ireland-issues-warning-on-unregistered-firm-02-dec-2024",
      "checked": "2026-10-28"
    },
    "asicQai": {
      "title": "It’s a scam! Celebrities are not getting rich from online investment trading platforms, National Anti-Scam Centre, March 2024",
      "url": "https://asic.gov.au/about-asic/news-centre/find-a-media-release/2024-releases/24-036mr-it-s-a-scam-celebrities-are-not-getting-rich-from-online-investment-trading-platforms/",
      "checked": "2026-10-28"
    }
  }
}