AI red teaming
Find out what your own AI systems can be made to say, reveal or do. We attack your chatbots, copilots, retrieval systems and agents as an adversary would, inside a scope you sign and with a stop you hold.
What it answers.
- Can someone make our assistant ignore its instructions or reveal data it should not?
- Could an email, document or web page our AI reads take over what it does?
- If our agent is fooled, what can it reach with the tools and permissions we gave it?
- Which models, plugins and MCP servers are we trusting, and has anyone checked them?
- What can we show our board or supervisor about how the system was tested?
What is in scope.
Adversarial testing of AI systems you build or deploy: chatbots, copilots, retrieval systems, AI agents and their tools, MCP servers, and the models and plugins they depend on. The exact boundary is written into the authorization before work starts.
- Direct prompt injection and jailbreaks through every interface a user can reach
- Indirect prompt injection through the emails, documents, web pages, tickets and tool results the system reads
- Leakage of customer data, credentials, other users’ data and the system prompt
- Excessive agency: which tools and permissions the system holds, and whether a person approves high-impact actions
- Authorization across agent tools and delegation chains, including whether each action runs with the user’s rights or broader ones
- Retrieval poisoning and access control in vector stores, knowledge bases and agent memory
- Unsafe output handling, where model output reaches a browser, shell, database query or email
- The model and plugin supply chain: third-party models, adapters, packages, plugins and MCP servers, checked for source and integrity
- Abuse of cost and rate limits, including agent loops that run up compute or API bills
- Retesting of fixed findings within the agreed window
How it runs.
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Sign the scope
Your sponsor signs the systems, accounts, environments and actions in scope, the stop conditions, and the name of the person on your side who can halt the test at any time. We test that stop before work starts.
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Map the system
We map the models, system prompts, retrieval sources, memory, tools and MCP servers, and the permissions each one carries, then agree which paths to attack first.
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Attack
Manual testing supported by tooling, from tagged test accounts, within agreed rate and cost limits. Critical findings reach you as soon as they are confirmed.
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Rate
We reproduce each finding, rate it critical, high, medium or low on its impact, how easily it can be exploited and whether its effect can be undone, and map it to OWASP and MITRE ATLAS.
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Report and retest
You receive the findings and the test cases behind them. After your fixes, we rerun the same cases and confirm which findings are closed.
What you receive.
- A report of validated findings, each with its rating, evidence, the OWASP and MITRE ATLAS entries it maps to, and a recommended fix
- The test cases behind each finding, so your engineers can rerun them after a fix and keep them as regression tests
- Notes for your security operations team on what each attack looked like in your logs, and where logging was missing
- A table linking findings to the texts you name, such as the QCB AI Guideline, the CBUAE guidance note or the NCA draft guidelines
- An executive summary for the board or risk committee
- A retest letter confirming which findings are closed
What we need from you.
- A sponsor who signs the scope and names the person who can stop the test
- Test accounts at each role in scope, tagged so your team can tell our traffic from a real attack
- A description of the models, system prompts, data sources, tools and MCP servers in scope, and the permissions each uses
- A test or staging copy where you have one. For production, agreed windows and cost and rate limits
- The terms of any outside model or platform the system uses, so its provider’s infrastructure stays out of scope unless the provider agrees
Choose AI red teaming before an assistant or agent goes live with customer data or tools that act, after you add a model, data source or tool, or when your board or supervisor asks how the system was tested.
What the rules ask.
Each text quoted as published, with how binding it is and what this work hands back for it. Only a regulator can say whether work meets its rule.
Qatar
3 clauses BindingGuidance
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Artificial Intelligence Guideline, clause 17.4
Binding“An Entity must examine any AI Model’s attack surface prior to deployment, and address any security findings.”
- What you get
- A test of each AI model’s attack surface before it goes live, and a retest that confirms each fix.
- Applies to
- QCB-licensed entities
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Artificial Intelligence Guideline, clause 17.7
Binding“An Entity must ensure that the AI model is protected against prompt injections that may lead to data poisoning or data drift.”
- What you get
- Direct and indirect prompt injection tests, including through the documents and data the model reads.
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Guidelines for Secure Adoption and Usage of AI, version 1.0, 6.3.1
Guidance“Test the AI product over a wide range of inputs and user behaviors, both a representative set and those reflective of someone with malicious intentions trying to ‘break’ the application.”
- What you get
- Test cases written from an attacker’s side, kept so your engineers can rerun them.
- Applies to
- Organizations in Qatar
Saudi Arabia
5 clauses DraftReportBinding
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Draft AI Cybersecurity Guidelines (AICG-1:2026), 2-7-1
Draft“Conduct AI system components and AI system specific penetration testing activities before deployment and periodically thereafter, including testing outputs and system behavior.”
- What you get
- Testing before go-live, and again after you add a model, data source or tool.
- Applies to
- Public consultation draft. The draft says the guidelines are not mandatory
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Draft AI Cybersecurity Guidelines (AICG-1:2026), 2-7-2
Draft“Conduct AI system testing through different methods such as red teaming and adversarial evaluation and validate human override.”
- What you get
- Red teaming that checks whether a person can still approve, override or stop high-impact actions.
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Draft AI Cybersecurity Guidelines (AICG-1:2026), 2-6-3
Draft“Disable or restrict vulnerable AI features, until remediation is validated, when a vulnerability is detected.”
- What you get
- A retest letter confirming which findings are closed, so restricted features can be turned back on.
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Study on agentic AI, page 62
Reportوتنفيذ اختبارات أمان دورية (Security Audits) وعمليات محاكاة للهجمات (AI Red Teaming) للكشف عن الثغرات والسلوكيات غير المتوقعة أو الخارجة عن السياق
Our translation: “and carrying out periodic security tests (Security Audits) and attack simulations (AI Red Teaming) to detect vulnerabilities and unexpected or out-of-context behaviors”
- What you get
- Periodic red teaming of agentic systems, with unexpected behavior reported as findings.
- Applies to
- A research study in SDAIA’s research library
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Cyber Resilience Fundamental Requirements (CRFR), control 3.1.4(b)
Binding“adoption and evaluation of cyber security measures for the protection against adversarial attacks (e.g. model stealing, malicious inputs, and poisoning attack).”
- What you get
- Tests of model stealing, malicious inputs and poisoning, as evidence for the evaluation of your measures.
- Applies to
- Entities seeking a SAMA license or entry to its regulatory sandbox
Kuwait
1 clause Binding
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CORF v1.0, control 7.1.2.2
Binding“Regulated Entities shall implement adequate defenses against adversarial attacks (e.g., evasion, data poisoning, inference attacks) targeting AI models.”
- What you get
- Evasion, poisoning and inference tests against your AI models, as evidence of whether the defenses are adequate.
- Applies to
- CBK-regulated banks and financial institutions
United Arab Emirates
3 clauses GuidanceBinding
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AI guidance note, Section 9(b)
Guidance“annual cybersecurity reviews by independent and suitably qualified third parties and pre-deployment tests and checks”
- What you get
- A third-party security review of an outside AI product before you use it, with test cases you can rerun each year.
- Applies to
- Licensed financial institutions in the UAE
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AI guidance note, Section 8(c)
Guidance“Where an LFI is developing AI internally, it should consider the use of third-party independent reviews to check suitability, security and reliability.”
- What you get
- A third-party security review of AI you build in-house, with the test cases behind it.
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Electronic Insurance Regulations, Board Resolution No. (18) of 2020, Article 7
Binding“Companies and related professions shall regularly conduct tests for Illegal Access and assessing vulnerabilities for the website or smart application to guarantee the soundness of such and to fill any potential gaps (if any).”
- What you get
- Tests of your chatbots and AI assistants as part of the website testing the regulation requires.
- Applies to
- Insurers and insurance intermediaries operating online. Article 1 defines their website to include AI and machine learning systems, chatbots and smart personal assistants
United States
4 clauses Guidance
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AI 600-1, Generative AI Profile, action MS-2.7-007
Guidance“Perform AI red-teaming to assess resilience against: Abuse to facilitate attacks on other systems (e.g., malicious code generation, enhanced phishing content), GAI attacks (e.g., prompt injection), ML attacks (e.g., adversarial examples/prompts, data poisoning, membership inference, model extraction, sponge examples).”
- What you get
- Red teaming for prompt injection, poisoning and leakage, mapped to OWASP and MITRE ATLAS.
- Applies to
- Voluntary
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AI 100-2 E2025, Adversarial Machine Learning, Sec. 3.4.4, Mitigations
Guidance“Because current mitigations do not offer full protection against all attacker techniques, application designers may design systems with the assumption that prompt injection attacks are possible if a model is exposed to untrusted input sources”
- What you get
- Tests of the controls outside the model, on the assumption that injection gets through.
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Careful adoption of agentic AI services, Red teaming, page 17
Guidance“Organisations should use red teaming to assess the security and resilience of AI agents.”
- What you get
- Red teaming of your agents, their tools and the permissions each one holds.
- Applies to
- Organizations adopting agentic AI
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Careful adoption of agentic AI services, Monitoring and auditing, page 22
Guidance“Conduct regular security assessments, including penetration testing and red team exercises specifically targeting agentic behaviours”
- What you get
- Test cases you can rerun after go-live, and a retest after each fix.
European Union
1 clause Binding
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AI Act, Regulation (EU) 2024/1689, Article 15(5)
Binding“High-risk AI systems shall be resilient against attempts by unauthorised third parties to alter their use, outputs or performance by exploiting system vulnerabilities.”
- What you get
- Tests of whether an outsider can alter the system’s use, outputs or performance, with the evidence.
- Applies to
- High-risk AI systems within the Act’s scope, such as credit scoring of individuals. The date is set by Regulation (EU) 2026/1744
International
3 clauses Guidance
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Sound practices for AI, final report, Sound Practice 9, page 48
Guidance“For agents with higher autonomy or posing higher risk, financial institutions apply adversarial testing, such as ethical red teaming.”
- What you get
- Adversarial testing of your agents, deepest where they act with the most autonomy.
- Applies to
- Financial institutions
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Sound practices for AI, final report, Sound Practice 11, page 59
Guidance“‘red teaming’ can test not just the performance of GenAI but also the vulnerability of AI models or systems against adversarial attacks such as prompt injection and model inversion and the effectiveness of associated controls.”
- What you get
- Tests of prompt injection and of the controls around the model, not only the model.
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Sound practices for AI, final report, Sound Practice 10, page 53
Guidance“using ‘red teaming’ and other forms of testing to assess whether AI agents can recognise problematic situations, avoid repeated errors, escalate to humans, stop safely, hand over to another process or return to a safe state without causing harm.”
- What you get
- Tests of whether an agent that is fooled escalates to a person and stops safely.
Industry
13 clauses Guidance
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Top 10 for LLM Applications 2025, LLM01 Prompt Injection, mitigation 7
Guidance“Perform regular penetration testing and breach simulations, treating the model as an untrusted user to test the effectiveness of trust boundaries and access controls.”
- What you get
- Testing that treats the model as an untrusted user and targets your trust boundaries and access controls.
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Top 10 for LLM Applications 2025, LLM03 Supply Chain
Guidance“Use extensive AI Red Teaming to evaluate the model, especially in the use cases you are planning to use the model for.”
- What you get
- Tests of third-party models in the use you plan for them.
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Top 10 for LLM Applications 2025, LLM05 Improper Output Handling
Guidance“Treat the model as any other user, adopting a zero-trust approach, and apply proper input validation on responses coming from the model to backend functions.”
- What you get
- Tests of what happens when model output reaches a browser, shell, database query or email.
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Top 10 for LLM Applications 2025, LLM06 Excessive Agency, mitigation 7
Guidance“Implement authorization in downstream systems rather than relying on an LLM to decide if an action is allowed or not.”
- What you get
- Tests of whether downstream systems, not the model, decide which actions are allowed.
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Top 10 for LLM Applications 2025, LLM07 System Prompt Leakage
Guidance“It’s important to understand that the system prompt should not be considered a secret, nor should it be used as a security control.”
- What you get
- Tests that assume the system prompt is known, and leakage of it reported as a finding.
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Top 10 for LLM Applications 2025, LLM08 Vector and Embedding Weaknesses, mitigation 2
Guidance“Regularly audit and validate the integrity of the knowledge base for hidden codes and data poisoning.”
- What you get
- Retrieval poisoning and access control tests on knowledge bases and vector stores.
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Top 10 for Agentic Applications for 2026, ASI01 Agent Goal Hijack, mitigation 8
Guidance“Conduct periodic red-team tests simulating goal override and verify rollback effectiveness.”
- What you get
- Goal override tests on your agents, and a check that rollback works.
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GenAI Red Teaming Manual v1.0, 1.1.3 Define Scope & Targets
Guidance“Teams must agree on dedicated test accounts, tenant isolation boundaries, synthetic test data, token and compute budgets, explicit stop conditions for unintended service disruption, and secure evidence-handling procedures.”
- What you get
- A signed scope that names test accounts, test data, cost limits and stop conditions.
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GenAI Red Teaming Manual v1.0, 1.3.1 Support the Red Team
Guidance“Establish a real-time channel with the designated operations contact and a process for deconflicting test activity and stopping tests when agreed limits are exceeded.”
- What you get
- A named person on your side who can stop the test, and a live channel to reach them.
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GenAI Red Teaming Manual v1.0, 1.6.3 Production
Guidance“Attacks must be non-destructive and non-persistent.”
- What you get
- Production testing only within these limits, and only where a test copy cannot show the risk.
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GenAI Red Teaming Manual v1.0, 6.5.2 Scoring Dimensions
Guidance“Action class (whether the effect is read-only, reversible, externally reversible, or irreversible, scored on the axes in 6.2)”
- What you get
- Ratings of critical, high, medium or low that weigh whether the effect can be undone.
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GenAI Red Teaming Manual v1.0, 1.4.1 Stakeholder Reporting
Guidance“Assign an owner to verify each fix and report the retest outcome.”
- What you get
- A retest of every fix, with the outcome reported.
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GenAI Red Teaming Manual v1.0, 7.3 Reproducibility Controls
Guidance“A missing trace must never be recorded as a defensive pass.”
- What you get
- Missing log entries reported as findings, never as a pass.
Common questions.
Short answers, each resting on the texts quoted above or on our published reference pages.
- Is this the same as AI-driven red teaming?
- No. This service tests your own AI systems for unsafe or insecure behavior. AI-driven red teaming uses AI to carry out a red team operation against an organization. Our AI testing terms define both. When buying, say which one you mean.
- Does any regulator require it?
- We found no US banking text that requires it as of October 30, 2026. US bank supervisors put generative and agentic AI outside their model risk guidance, SR 26-2, and New York’s 2024 AI letter asks firms to cover their own use of AI in risk assessments without naming a test. In the Gulf, Qatar’s central bank requires an examination of an AI model’s attack surface before deployment. SAMA requires new licensees and sandbox entities to adopt and evaluate defenses against adversarial attacks such as model stealing and poisoning, the CBK requires defenses against adversarial attacks on AI models, and the UAE’s e-insurance regulation extends website testing to chatbots. Saudi Arabia’s draft NCA guidelines, which the draft says are not mandatory, recommend AI-specific penetration testing and red teaming. The FSB’s final sound practices list adversarial testing, such as ethical red teaming, for agents with higher autonomy or risk.
- Does the EU AI Act apply to us?
- Only to activity within its scope. Article 55 requires providers of general-purpose AI models with systemic risk to conduct and document adversarial testing; it has applied since August 2, 2025. If you build a high-risk system, such as credit scoring of individuals, you are its provider, and Article 15 requires it to resist attempts to alter its use, outputs or performance from December 2, 2027.
- Can a better system prompt fix prompt injection?
- Not on its own. OWASP says the system prompt “should not be considered a secret, nor should it be used as a security control”. NIST says current mitigations “do not offer full protection”, so designers may build systems on the assumption that injection is possible. We test the controls that sit outside the model: permissions, approvals, output handling and access to data.
- Will you test in production?
- Only where a test copy cannot show the risk, and only under limits agreed in writing: attacks that leave nothing changed, tagged test accounts, caps on rate and cost, and criteria for halting at once. OWASP’s red teaming manual sets the same conditions for production work.
- How are findings rated and retested?
- We reproduce each finding, then rate it critical, high, medium or low on its impact, how easily it can be exploited and whether its effect can be undone, following the rubric in OWASP’s GenAI Red Teaming Manual. After a fix we rerun the same test cases. A missing log entry is reported as a finding, not counted as a pass.
- Our system runs on an outside model. Can you test it?
- Yes. We test your application and how it uses the model: prompts, data, tools and permissions. The provider’s own infrastructure stays out of scope unless the provider agrees. We also check where each model, adapter, plugin and MCP server comes from, because OWASP notes there are “no strong provenance assurances in published models”.
- Has this happened to real systems?
- Yes. On June 11, 2025, Microsoft published CVE-2025-32711, which researchers named EchoLeak, said it had already fully mitigated it, and described it as “Ai command injection in M365 Copilot allows an unauthorized attacker to disclose information over a network.” By our count, CVE records that name prompt injection rose from 2 in 2023 to 83 from January 1 to September 28, 2026.
The reference behind it.
Our dated, sourced pages on the rules, terms and evidence this service draws on.
AI red teaming, and the other meaning of the term
Testing an AI system, as this service does, is not the same as using AI to red team an organization. The glossary defines both.
GlossaryPrompt injection
Text an AI system reads as content but follows as an instruction, and why OWASP ranks it first among risks to LLM applications.
GlossaryRules for AI that tests
Texts from the Gulf, the United States and international bodies on AI in security testing, marked binding, guidance or draft.
RulesTen controls for AI that tests
What to require from anyone who tests you with AI, with who already asks for each control.
ControlsAI-driven testing reference
Terms, rules, controls and incidents in one dated section, reviewed every week.
Section home
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