AI red teaming

Find out what your own AI systems can be made to say, reveal or do. We attack your chatbots, copilots, retrieval systems and agents as an adversary would, inside a scope you sign and with a stop you hold.

Oil painting of a figure seen from behind holding a brass cam disc up to an oil lamp beside a brass writing automaton at night, its back open on a stack of cam discs, a moonlit sea beyond the window.

What it answers.

What is in scope.

Adversarial testing of AI systems you build or deploy: chatbots, copilots, retrieval systems, AI agents and their tools, MCP servers, and the models and plugins they depend on. The exact boundary is written into the authorization before work starts.

How it runs.

  1. Sign the scope

    Your sponsor signs the systems, accounts, environments and actions in scope, the stop conditions, and the name of the person on your side who can halt the test at any time. We test that stop before work starts.

  2. Map the system

    We map the models, system prompts, retrieval sources, memory, tools and MCP servers, and the permissions each one carries, then agree which paths to attack first.

  3. Attack

    Manual testing supported by tooling, from tagged test accounts, within agreed rate and cost limits. Critical findings reach you as soon as they are confirmed.

  4. Rate

    We reproduce each finding, rate it critical, high, medium or low on its impact, how easily it can be exploited and whether its effect can be undone, and map it to OWASP and MITRE ATLAS.

  5. Report and retest

    You receive the findings and the test cases behind them. After your fixes, we rerun the same cases and confirm which findings are closed.

What you receive.

  • A report of validated findings, each with its rating, evidence, the OWASP and MITRE ATLAS entries it maps to, and a recommended fix
  • The test cases behind each finding, so your engineers can rerun them after a fix and keep them as regression tests
  • Notes for your security operations team on what each attack looked like in your logs, and where logging was missing
  • A table linking findings to the texts you name, such as the QCB AI Guideline, the CBUAE guidance note or the NCA draft guidelines
  • An executive summary for the board or risk committee
  • A retest letter confirming which findings are closed

What we need from you.

  • A sponsor who signs the scope and names the person who can stop the test
  • Test accounts at each role in scope, tagged so your team can tell our traffic from a real attack
  • A description of the models, system prompts, data sources, tools and MCP servers in scope, and the permissions each uses
  • A test or staging copy where you have one. For production, agreed windows and cost and rate limits
  • The terms of any outside model or platform the system uses, so its provider’s infrastructure stays out of scope unless the provider agrees

Choose AI red teaming before an assistant or agent goes live with customer data or tools that act, after you add a model, data source or tool, or when your board or supervisor asks how the system was tested.

What the rules ask.

Each text quoted as published, with how binding it is and what this work hands back for it. Only a regulator can say whether work meets its rule.

Qatar

3 clauses BindingGuidance
  1. Qatar Central Bank, September 4, 2024

    Artificial Intelligence Guideline, clause 17.4

    Binding
    “An Entity must examine any AI Model’s attack surface prior to deployment, and address any security findings.”
    What you get
    A test of each AI model’s attack surface before it goes live, and a retest that confirms each fix.
    Applies to
    QCB-licensed entities
  2. Qatar Central Bank, September 4, 2024

    Artificial Intelligence Guideline, clause 17.7

    Binding
    “An Entity must ensure that the AI model is protected against prompt injections that may lead to data poisoning or data drift.”
    What you get
    Direct and indirect prompt injection tests, including through the documents and data the model reads.
  3. National Cyber Security Agency, February 2024

    Guidelines for Secure Adoption and Usage of AI, version 1.0, 6.3.1

    Guidance
    “Test the AI product over a wide range of inputs and user behaviors, both a representative set and those reflective of someone with malicious intentions trying to ‘break’ the application.”
    What you get
    Test cases written from an attacker’s side, kept so your engineers can rerun them.
    Applies to
    Organizations in Qatar

Saudi Arabia

5 clauses DraftReportBinding
  1. National Cybersecurity Authority, July 2026

    Draft AI Cybersecurity Guidelines (AICG-1:2026), 2-7-1

    Draft
    “Conduct AI system components and AI system specific penetration testing activities before deployment and periodically thereafter, including testing outputs and system behavior.”
    What you get
    Testing before go-live, and again after you add a model, data source or tool.
    Applies to
    Public consultation draft. The draft says the guidelines are not mandatory
  2. National Cybersecurity Authority, July 2026

    Draft AI Cybersecurity Guidelines (AICG-1:2026), 2-7-2

    Draft
    “Conduct AI system testing through different methods such as red teaming and adversarial evaluation and validate human override.”
    What you get
    Red teaming that checks whether a person can still approve, override or stop high-impact actions.
  3. National Cybersecurity Authority, July 2026

    Draft AI Cybersecurity Guidelines (AICG-1:2026), 2-6-3

    Draft
    “Disable or restrict vulnerable AI features, until remediation is validated, when a vulnerability is detected.”
    What you get
    A retest letter confirming which findings are closed, so restricted features can be turned back on.
  4. Saudi Data and AI Authority, July 2025

    Study on agentic AI, page 62

    Report
    وتنفيذ اختبارات أمان دورية (Security Audits) وعمليات محاكاة للهجمات (AI Red Teaming) للكشف عن الثغرات والسلوكيات غير المتوقعة أو الخارجة عن السياق

    Our translation: “and carrying out periodic security tests (Security Audits) and attack simulations (AI Red Teaming) to detect vulnerabilities and unexpected or out-of-context behaviors”

    What you get
    Periodic red teaming of agentic systems, with unexpected behavior reported as findings.
    Applies to
    A research study in SDAIA’s research library
  5. Saudi Central Bank (SAMA), January 2022

    Cyber Resilience Fundamental Requirements (CRFR), control 3.1.4(b)

    Binding
    “adoption and evaluation of cyber security measures for the protection against adversarial attacks (e.g. model stealing, malicious inputs, and poisoning attack).”
    What you get
    Tests of model stealing, malicious inputs and poisoning, as evidence for the evaluation of your measures.
    Applies to
    Entities seeking a SAMA license or entry to its regulatory sandbox

Kuwait

1 clause Binding
  1. Central Bank of Kuwait, December 3, 2025

    CORF v1.0, control 7.1.2.2

    Binding
    “Regulated Entities shall implement adequate defenses against adversarial attacks (e.g., evasion, data poisoning, inference attacks) targeting AI models.”
    What you get
    Evasion, poisoning and inference tests against your AI models, as evidence of whether the defenses are adequate.
    Applies to
    CBK-regulated banks and financial institutions

United Arab Emirates

3 clauses GuidanceBinding
  1. Central Bank of the UAE, February 11, 2026

    AI guidance note, Section 9(b)

    Guidance
    “annual cybersecurity reviews by independent and suitably qualified third parties and pre-deployment tests and checks”
    What you get
    A third-party security review of an outside AI product before you use it, with test cases you can rerun each year.
    Applies to
    Licensed financial institutions in the UAE
  2. Central Bank of the UAE, February 11, 2026

    AI guidance note, Section 8(c)

    Guidance
    “Where an LFI is developing AI internally, it should consider the use of third-party independent reviews to check suitability, security and reliability.”
    What you get
    A third-party security review of AI you build in-house, with the test cases behind it.
  3. Central Bank of the UAE, issued by the former Insurance Authority, April 28, 2020

    Electronic Insurance Regulations, Board Resolution No. (18) of 2020, Article 7

    Binding
    “Companies and related professions shall regularly conduct tests for Illegal Access and assessing vulnerabilities for the website or smart application to guarantee the soundness of such and to fill any potential gaps (if any).”
    What you get
    Tests of your chatbots and AI assistants as part of the website testing the regulation requires.
    Applies to
    Insurers and insurance intermediaries operating online. Article 1 defines their website to include AI and machine learning systems, chatbots and smart personal assistants

United States

4 clauses Guidance
  1. NIST, July 2024

    AI 600-1, Generative AI Profile, action MS-2.7-007

    Guidance
    “Perform AI red-teaming to assess resilience against: Abuse to facilitate attacks on other systems (e.g., malicious code generation, enhanced phishing content), GAI attacks (e.g., prompt injection), ML attacks (e.g., adversarial examples/prompts, data poisoning, membership inference, model extraction, sponge examples).”
    What you get
    Red teaming for prompt injection, poisoning and leakage, mapped to OWASP and MITRE ATLAS.
    Applies to
    Voluntary
  2. NIST, March 2025

    AI 100-2 E2025, Adversarial Machine Learning, Sec. 3.4.4, Mitigations

    Guidance
    “Because current mitigations do not offer full protection against all attacker techniques, application designers may design systems with the assumption that prompt injection attacks are possible if a model is exposed to untrusted input sources”
    What you get
    Tests of the controls outside the model, on the assumption that injection gets through.
  3. CISA and NSA, with the Australian, Canadian, New Zealand and UK cyber agencies, May 1, 2026

    Careful adoption of agentic AI services, Red teaming, page 17

    Guidance
    “Organisations should use red teaming to assess the security and resilience of AI agents.”
    What you get
    Red teaming of your agents, their tools and the permissions each one holds.
    Applies to
    Organizations adopting agentic AI
  4. CISA and NSA, with the Australian, Canadian, New Zealand and UK cyber agencies, May 1, 2026

    Careful adoption of agentic AI services, Monitoring and auditing, page 22

    Guidance
    “Conduct regular security assessments, including penetration testing and red team exercises specifically targeting agentic behaviours”
    What you get
    Test cases you can rerun after go-live, and a retest after each fix.

European Union

1 clause Binding
  1. European Parliament and Council of the European Union, July 12, 2024

    AI Act, Regulation (EU) 2024/1689, Article 15(5)

    Binding Due December 2, 2027
    “High-risk AI systems shall be resilient against attempts by unauthorised third parties to alter their use, outputs or performance by exploiting system vulnerabilities.”
    What you get
    Tests of whether an outsider can alter the system’s use, outputs or performance, with the evidence.
    Applies to
    High-risk AI systems within the Act’s scope, such as credit scoring of individuals. The date is set by Regulation (EU) 2026/1744

International

3 clauses Guidance
  1. Financial Stability Board, October 15, 2026

    Sound practices for AI, final report, Sound Practice 9, page 48

    Guidance
    “For agents with higher autonomy or posing higher risk, financial institutions apply adversarial testing, such as ethical red teaming.”
    What you get
    Adversarial testing of your agents, deepest where they act with the most autonomy.
    Applies to
    Financial institutions
  2. Financial Stability Board, October 15, 2026

    Sound practices for AI, final report, Sound Practice 11, page 59

    Guidance
    “‘red teaming’ can test not just the performance of GenAI but also the vulnerability of AI models or systems against adversarial attacks such as prompt injection and model inversion and the effectiveness of associated controls.”
    What you get
    Tests of prompt injection and of the controls around the model, not only the model.
  3. Financial Stability Board, October 15, 2026

    Sound practices for AI, final report, Sound Practice 10, page 53

    Guidance
    “using ‘red teaming’ and other forms of testing to assess whether AI agents can recognise problematic situations, avoid repeated errors, escalate to humans, stop safely, hand over to another process or return to a safe state without causing harm.”
    What you get
    Tests of whether an agent that is fooled escalates to a person and stops safely.

Industry

13 clauses Guidance
  1. OWASP Gen AI Security Project, 2025

    Top 10 for LLM Applications 2025, LLM01 Prompt Injection, mitigation 7

    Guidance
    “Perform regular penetration testing and breach simulations, treating the model as an untrusted user to test the effectiveness of trust boundaries and access controls.”
    What you get
    Testing that treats the model as an untrusted user and targets your trust boundaries and access controls.
  2. OWASP Gen AI Security Project, 2025

    Top 10 for LLM Applications 2025, LLM03 Supply Chain

    Guidance
    “Use extensive AI Red Teaming to evaluate the model, especially in the use cases you are planning to use the model for.”
    What you get
    Tests of third-party models in the use you plan for them.
  3. OWASP Gen AI Security Project, 2025

    Top 10 for LLM Applications 2025, LLM05 Improper Output Handling

    Guidance
    “Treat the model as any other user, adopting a zero-trust approach, and apply proper input validation on responses coming from the model to backend functions.”
    What you get
    Tests of what happens when model output reaches a browser, shell, database query or email.
  4. OWASP Gen AI Security Project, 2025

    Top 10 for LLM Applications 2025, LLM06 Excessive Agency, mitigation 7

    Guidance
    “Implement authorization in downstream systems rather than relying on an LLM to decide if an action is allowed or not.”
    What you get
    Tests of whether downstream systems, not the model, decide which actions are allowed.
  5. OWASP Gen AI Security Project, 2025

    Top 10 for LLM Applications 2025, LLM07 System Prompt Leakage

    Guidance
    “It’s important to understand that the system prompt should not be considered a secret, nor should it be used as a security control.”
    What you get
    Tests that assume the system prompt is known, and leakage of it reported as a finding.
  6. OWASP Gen AI Security Project, 2025

    Top 10 for LLM Applications 2025, LLM08 Vector and Embedding Weaknesses, mitigation 2

    Guidance
    “Regularly audit and validate the integrity of the knowledge base for hidden codes and data poisoning.”
    What you get
    Retrieval poisoning and access control tests on knowledge bases and vector stores.
  7. OWASP Gen AI Security Project, December 9, 2025

    Top 10 for Agentic Applications for 2026, ASI01 Agent Goal Hijack, mitigation 8

    Guidance
    “Conduct periodic red-team tests simulating goal override and verify rollback effectiveness.”
    What you get
    Goal override tests on your agents, and a check that rollback works.
  8. OWASP Gen AI Security Project, October 20, 2026

    GenAI Red Teaming Manual v1.0, 1.1.3 Define Scope & Targets

    Guidance
    “Teams must agree on dedicated test accounts, tenant isolation boundaries, synthetic test data, token and compute budgets, explicit stop conditions for unintended service disruption, and secure evidence-handling procedures.”
    What you get
    A signed scope that names test accounts, test data, cost limits and stop conditions.
  9. OWASP Gen AI Security Project, October 20, 2026

    GenAI Red Teaming Manual v1.0, 1.3.1 Support the Red Team

    Guidance
    “Establish a real-time channel with the designated operations contact and a process for deconflicting test activity and stopping tests when agreed limits are exceeded.”
    What you get
    A named person on your side who can stop the test, and a live channel to reach them.
  10. OWASP Gen AI Security Project, October 20, 2026

    GenAI Red Teaming Manual v1.0, 1.6.3 Production

    Guidance
    “Attacks must be non-destructive and non-persistent.”
    What you get
    Production testing only within these limits, and only where a test copy cannot show the risk.
  11. OWASP Gen AI Security Project, October 20, 2026

    GenAI Red Teaming Manual v1.0, 6.5.2 Scoring Dimensions

    Guidance
    “Action class (whether the effect is read-only, reversible, externally reversible, or irreversible, scored on the axes in 6.2)”
    What you get
    Ratings of critical, high, medium or low that weigh whether the effect can be undone.
  12. OWASP Gen AI Security Project, October 20, 2026

    GenAI Red Teaming Manual v1.0, 1.4.1 Stakeholder Reporting

    Guidance
    “Assign an owner to verify each fix and report the retest outcome.”
    What you get
    A retest of every fix, with the outcome reported.
  13. OWASP Gen AI Security Project, October 20, 2026

    GenAI Red Teaming Manual v1.0, 7.3 Reproducibility Controls

    Guidance
    “A missing trace must never be recorded as a defensive pass.”
    What you get
    Missing log entries reported as findings, never as a pass.

Common questions.

Short answers, each resting on the texts quoted above or on our published reference pages.

Is this the same as AI-driven red teaming?
No. This service tests your own AI systems for unsafe or insecure behavior. AI-driven red teaming uses AI to carry out a red team operation against an organization. Our AI testing terms define both. When buying, say which one you mean.
Does any regulator require it?
We found no US banking text that requires it as of October 30, 2026. US bank supervisors put generative and agentic AI outside their model risk guidance, SR 26-2, and New York’s 2024 AI letter asks firms to cover their own use of AI in risk assessments without naming a test. In the Gulf, Qatar’s central bank requires an examination of an AI model’s attack surface before deployment. SAMA requires new licensees and sandbox entities to adopt and evaluate defenses against adversarial attacks such as model stealing and poisoning, the CBK requires defenses against adversarial attacks on AI models, and the UAE’s e-insurance regulation extends website testing to chatbots. Saudi Arabia’s draft NCA guidelines, which the draft says are not mandatory, recommend AI-specific penetration testing and red teaming. The FSB’s final sound practices list adversarial testing, such as ethical red teaming, for agents with higher autonomy or risk.
Does the EU AI Act apply to us?
Only to activity within its scope. Article 55 requires providers of general-purpose AI models with systemic risk to conduct and document adversarial testing; it has applied since August 2, 2025. If you build a high-risk system, such as credit scoring of individuals, you are its provider, and Article 15 requires it to resist attempts to alter its use, outputs or performance from December 2, 2027.
Can a better system prompt fix prompt injection?
Not on its own. OWASP says the system prompt “should not be considered a secret, nor should it be used as a security control”. NIST says current mitigations “do not offer full protection”, so designers may build systems on the assumption that injection is possible. We test the controls that sit outside the model: permissions, approvals, output handling and access to data.
Will you test in production?
Only where a test copy cannot show the risk, and only under limits agreed in writing: attacks that leave nothing changed, tagged test accounts, caps on rate and cost, and criteria for halting at once. OWASP’s red teaming manual sets the same conditions for production work.
How are findings rated and retested?
We reproduce each finding, then rate it critical, high, medium or low on its impact, how easily it can be exploited and whether its effect can be undone, following the rubric in OWASP’s GenAI Red Teaming Manual. After a fix we rerun the same test cases. A missing log entry is reported as a finding, not counted as a pass.
Our system runs on an outside model. Can you test it?
Yes. We test your application and how it uses the model: prompts, data, tools and permissions. The provider’s own infrastructure stays out of scope unless the provider agrees. We also check where each model, adapter, plugin and MCP server comes from, because OWASP notes there are “no strong provenance assurances in published models”.
Has this happened to real systems?
Yes. On June 11, 2025, Microsoft published CVE-2025-32711, which researchers named EchoLeak, said it had already fully mitigated it, and described it as “Ai command injection in M365 Copilot allows an unauthorized attacker to disclose information over a network.” By our count, CVE records that name prompt injection rose from 2 in 2023 to 83 from January 1 to September 28, 2026.

The reference behind it.

Our dated, sourced pages on the rules, terms and evidence this service draws on.

Describe the AI system you want tested.

Write from your organization’s email address. Tell us what is in scope, your deadline and who can authorize testing. Leave sensitive details out of the first message.